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Alternative Schools: 
Better Guardians 
than Family or State? 
JUDITH C. AREEN 
Georgetown University Law Center 
Alternative schools have become increasingly popular in this 
country in the last few years, at least as measured by the 
amount of attention focused on them by magazines and TV 
networks. A whole new genre of books has emerged, too, 
beginning with Paul Goodman's Compulsory Mis-Education and 
followed by the Kozol-Holt-Herndon series on the failings of 
most public schools. A. S. Neil's Summerhill and Maria Montes- 
sori were rediscovered; Jay Featherstone publicized the British 
Infant School model; and George Dennison described his ex- 
periences with a new school for poor inner-city children. 
Alternative schools began appearing as well, growing in the 
last five years from perhaps twenty-five to over 600. Over 200 
were founded in the past year alone,1 and these statistics do 
not reflect the growing number of public schools which have 
been remodeled drastically enough to deserve the label "al- 
ternative schools." 
This is not to suggest that demands for alternatives to public 
schools are new. Rather, there have been strong clashes be- 
tween families and the state over how to educate children since 
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schooling was first made compulsory in the nineteenth centu- 
ry. The issues involved varied as much as families do in their 
notions of what values or skills to teach or of how to teach. 
The state, by contract, was fairly consistent in its position of 
using the public schools to further the melting pot. One lan- 
guage was encouraged as was the development of a uniform 
curriculum which would teach all children what they would 
need to know to become responsible citizens. 
The biggest fight initially was over the role of religion. 
Should religious values be taught in publicly funded schools? 
If so, from which viewpoint? Because this second question was 
so difficult to answer in our religiously pluralistic society with 
its tradition of resistance to state-imposed religion, the state 
adopted a hands-off policy. It did not forbid religious schools, 
but it would not encourage them by supplying state funds. 
The number of privately funded church-related schools grew 
nonetheless, so that today most nonpublic alternative schools 
are church related.2 
Now even that religious compromise is challenged. While 
some parents still want the opportunity to choose church- 
related schools, they also want them to provide the 
same scope and quality of secular instruction as public schools. 
These demands, translated into requests for more courses or 
smaller classes, have forced church-related schools to hire 
more lay teachers-who cost more than teaching clergy. The 
clergy, too, want more pay for their labor. Costs in church- 
related schools have thus spiraled to the point where it is 
becoming impossible to provide the quality demanded at a 
price parents can or will pay. 
Challenges to Public Schools 
But the significant change in the challenge to the public 
school system is not the new urgency of financial demands 
from church-related schools. It is the increasing number of 
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parents who are dissatisfied with public schools not for reli- 
gious but for pedagogic, cultural, or political reasons. Black 
parents are demanding schools that teach black history and 
culture. Many want schools that will teach their children as 
successfully as white children are taught. They want better 
reading and math scores today and equal job success tomor- 
row. White parents are also complaining about course content. 
Some parents of all races want schools to focus more on 
personal development and fulfillment and less on preparing 
children just to fit into the present job structure. Others argue 
about the amount of discipline exercised. Some want a greater 
racial or socioeconomic mix of students in their schools; 
others, a smaller one. 
These diverse complaints appear to have a common thread 
that may be the real concern of most parents: individual public 
schools are too insulated from the families they serve. It is 
ironic that in a nation officially opposed to the evils of mo- 
nopoly, particularly in the insidious guise of socialism, we have 
an education system that offers no choice to most parents. 
Imagine the protest if we were allowed to see only one channel 
of free TV, a channel operated by the government. Yet, we 
blithely require most children to spend over ten of their most 
formative years in one government-operated school. 
In theory, the monopoly structure should not matter where 
parents can exercise some control over the school, by vote 
when the next school board member is up for reelection, or by 
lobbying for statutory changes in the state legislature. But in 
fact such control seems sadly inadequate when compared to 
the pervasive role the school plays in the lives of most children. 
Parent control is almost lacking where school boards are ap- 
pointed. The monopoly structure has not been widely chal- 
lenged since it is by definition established to respond to the 
preferences of the local majority. They select the majority of 
the school board, who then impose the style of schooling 
favored by the majority of all schools in the district. Only those 
who differ from majority preferences in some fashion are 
forced to go to a school not to their liking (unless they are 
wealthy enough to move to a different district or to afford a 
private school). 
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Traditionally most alternative school supporters have look- 
ed outside public school systems for change. Consequently 
their biggest problem usually is obtaining enough money to 
operate. But to the extent that parents' objections to public 
schools are the result of the structure of public school systems, 
it may turn out to be more feasible to make public schools 
"private" than to make private schools "public."3 
Currently, many educators who object to providing 
vouchers or tax credits to enable parents to select "private" 
alternative schools at the same time agree to the merits of 
parental options within the public system.4 Either approach, of 
course, will require fairly drastic changes in the way schools 
are funded and students and schools paired, and for the most 
part they are changes that no one person or group has the 
authority to make. On the other hand, a variety of decision 
makers, ranging from the local school administrators, the 
school board, the city council, state education officials, the state 
legislature, to the governor, can effectively veto such changes. 
School boards, for example, do not have the authority in most 
cases to provide public money to private alternative schools 
even if they wish. In many states a constitutional amendment 
would be required;5 in most others a special bill would have to 
be passed by the state legislature to enable even one district to 
provide public funds to even one such alternative school. 
Prospects for Legislative Support 
Prospects for such legislative action are dim at present, 
primarily because there is not a sizable constituency committed 
to supporting aid to secular alternative schools. On the other 
hand, there is a large group of parents supporting aid to 
church-related schools who have been very successful recently 
in getting aid bills enacted. Significantly, both major party 
candidates this year endorsed the concept of aid to 
church-related schools. The aid bills passed to date, however, 
do not proffer much help for secular alternative schools. The 
amounts appropriated average less than $200 a student, which 
is of little use to alternative schools which have neither a 
religious sponsor nor rich patrons to foot the rest of the bill. 
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Interestingly, the Supreme Court has kept the way open for 
broader financial support to alternative schools by striking 
down all legislation reviewed to date on the grounds that it 
violates the constitutional wall between church and state. 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court declared uncon- 
stitutional two state programs that reimbursed nonpublic 
schools for certain instructional costs.6 The Pennsylvania pro- 
gram had attempted to avoid church-state prohibitions by lim- 
iting reimbursement to instruction in courses legislatively 
defined as "secular": mathematics, physical education, physical 
(but not biological) sciences, and modern (but not ancient) 
languages. The Rhode Island program made a similar attempt 
by limiting reimbursement to the salaries of "secular" teachers, 
who were defined as those who (1) taught "secular" subjects 
and (2) signed a pledge that they did not teach religion. The 
Court, in rejecting both attempts, affirmed that there are two 
related tests that any aid program in this area must pass: (1) 
the traditional secular purpose plus neutral effect standard 
first enunciated in Allen v. Board of Education,7 plus (2) the 
more recent "no excessive entanglement" standard first men- 
tioned last year in Walz v. Tax Commission.8 The majority of the 
Court in Lemon, affirming what may be a legal cul-de-sac, 
found that the very attempts made by Pennsylvania and Rhode 
Island to separate secular from sectarian costs had excessively 
entangled them in the affairs of the church-related schools in 
violation of the Walz standard. 
This fall the Court affirmed without opinion a lower court 
decision holding unconstitutional an Ohio program which 
would have reimbursed parents for up to $102 of the tuition 
spent for each child in a nonpublic school.9 The lower court in 
Wolman v. Essexxo emphasized that the grants went only to 
nonpublic schools and that the schools were predominately of 
one religious group.xx This may indicate some willingness to 
distinguish aid proposals which involve all students and which 
provide enough aid per student that church-related schools 
need not be the primary beneficiaries. On the other hand, the 
lower court asserted that the principle of the First Amendment 
is to prohibit the state from providing any funds which directly 
support or sponsor any church-related institution, adding that 
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this constitutional policy does not turn on the amount of aid a 
statute provides in any particular school year.12 
A recent decision by a federal court in New York introduces 
another possible vehicle for effectively aiding only church- 
related schools. Committee for Public Education and Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquest13 upheld New York state tax credits for a 
portion of the nonpublic school tuition paid on up to three 
children per family, despite a dissent arguing there is no 
difference between a parent's receiving a $50 reimbursement 
for tuition paid to a parochial school and his receiving a $50 
benefit because he sends his child to a parochial school.14 One 
difference is that poor parents may not pay enough in taxes to 
receive any benefit. Tax credits may thus be even more detri- 
mental to the education of most poor children than no benefits 
at all. 
A critical factor in the future of nonpublic schools, there- 
fore, will be whether the Supreme Court buys the "tax- 
credit-is-not-a-grant" distinction. If it does, church-related 
schools may be saved and even encouraged - but probably no 
others. 
One hopeful sign for alternative school supporters is the 
interest that has been shown in trying an education voucher 
system. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) has an- 
nounced its willingness to help finance voucher demonstra- 
tions in which elementary school children would have their 
education financed for five or six years by allocating public 
education monies to parents in the form of vouchers or grants 
which could be redeemed at approved schools of their 
choice.15 The presumption is that schools would become more 
responsive to parents' interests in order to retain their students 
and budgets. The expected shift in orientation from a supply- 
to a demand-centered school system should facilitate the devel- 
opment of alternative schools both inside and outside the 
public system. 
Currently Alum Rock, an elementary school district in San 
Jose, California, has begun an actual test of the voucher con- 
cept. Its test is limited to public schools this first year because 
the legislature failed to authorize the participation of any 
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nonpublic schools in the test. Nonetheless, we will for the first 
time have a chance to see how parents in a community re- 
spond to the possibility of choosing among different schools 
for their children. 
While most national education groups are on record as 
opposing even a test of vouchers, some have indicated sup- 
port.16 Congress has resisted vigorous lobbying efforts to stop 
the OEO demonstrations. Connecticut, moreover, has passed 
legislation authorizing a full test at the option of one of its 
local school boards,7 and cities in New York, Ohio, and Wis- 
consin have expressed strong interest in hosting additional dem- 
onstrations. 
Significantly, increasing numbers of educators have argued 
that they do not need vouchers in their communities because 
they are introducing choice within their school systems. It 
remains to be seen whether the choices offered will reflect the 
wishes of parents (even if they constitute only a minority by 
race, income, or educational taste in the community) or only 
those of the public school administrators. But the willingness 
even to speak in favor of parental choice represents a significant 
change. 
The Common School Tradition 
A major obstacle still confronting the alternative movement 
is our uniform common school tradition. From the earliest 
recorded school law (1647 in Massachusetts) designed to out- 
maneuver Satan's efforts to keep men from knowledge of the 
true Scripturess1 states have first offered and later forced 
schooling on ever larger numbers of individuals for ever long- 
er periods. 
Initially this effort was focused on poor children. In 1787 
Benjamin Rush proposed a plan for a system of free schools 
for the poor children of Philadelphia. By 1804, Washington, 
D.C., had established such a school system for its poor children 
with Thomas Jefferson as its first school board president. 
For children who were not poor, the primary responsibility 
remained for a time with their parents. As late as 1827 Kent 
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observed: "During the minority of the child ...the parent is 
absolutely bound to provide reasonably for his maintenance 
and education; and he may be sued for necessaries furnished, 
and schooling given to a child, under just and reasonable 
circumstance." This obligation was not without its rewards: "In 
consequence of obligation of the father to provide for the 
maintenance, and, in some qualified degree, for the education 
of his infant children, he is entitled to the custody of their 
persons, and to the value of their labor and services."19 
But the common school doctrine soon spread to include 
schools for all children, not just the poor. The first publicly 
funded high school was established in 1821. By 1890 about 7 
percent of 14- 17-year-olds were enrolled, and by 1930, 51 
percent of this age group were in high school.20 
By the 1880s the rationale for providing education focused 
less on moral or spiritual fulfillment and more on maintaining 
the social order: 
The accumulation of riches in this country, brought about by the 
rapidity of industrial and commercial movements, tends to devote 
the sweat and lives of many to the few. If the elevation of the 
masses does not keep pace with this materialistic progress, misery 
and demoralization will increase in proportion to the augmenta- 
tion of production. Communism and socialism will then claim to 
be heard 
.... Nothing less than the State can check the prevalence 
of the revolutionary ideas and the assailment of social and pro- 
prietary rights .... Shall she establish a network of police force? 
This is the weakest and most unworthy of all remedies.... The 
first step of the State should be to get possession of the minds of 
men; get control of their ideas .... This can be accomplished by a 
system of uniform, well-organized and liberally supported public 
schools. ... The power of education, rightly conducted, is almost 
omnipotent. It will make useful and peaceable citizens out of 
ninety percent of the worst children who fall under its influence.21 
It was also at this point that the shift from voluntary to com- 
pulsory schooling took place, encouraged by a desire to Ameri- 
canize the flood of immigrants: "It is largely through immigra- 
tion that the number of ignorant, vagrant, and criminal youth 
has recently multiplied to an extent truly alarming in some of 
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our cities. Their depravity is sometimes defiant and their resis- 
tance to moral suasion is obstinate. When personal effort and 
persuasion and organized benevolence have utterly failed, let 
the law take them in hand, first to the public school, and if 
there incorrigibly, then to the Reform School."22 
Initially, the compulsory education laws allowed parents a 
range of choice in schooling. The 1874 New York law, for 
example, specified that children aged 8- 14 could attend some 
public or private school for at least fourteen weeks a year, or 
be instructed at home for the same period in spelling, reading, 
writing, English grammar, geography, and arithmetic.23 By 
1909, however, the state required regular attendance of chil- 
dren aged 7- 16 at a public school conducted in English, or 
equivalent instruction by a competent teacher for the same 
number of hours.24 
Today the common school doctrine has spread to the point 
where 90 percent of all students finish at least one year of high 
school and 80 percent graduate.25 It is a system in which 
control of the schools is concentrated in the hands of ever 
fewer educators and school boards. The number of school 
districts declined from 127,531 in 1930 to less than 20,440 in 
1968.26 Even at that number, the supposed diversity of the 
systems is more illusory than real, especially in large cities. If 
someone were placed blindfolded in an elementary school 
classroom in New York, Chicago, or San Francisco, it is unlike- 
ly that he could tell one from another. 
Equal Opportunity Issues 
In addition to facing the steady trend toward uniform com- 
mon schools, supporters of alternative schools must confront 
the need to promote equality of educational opportunity en- 
dorsed by the judiciary in Brown v. Board of Education.27 Un- 
fortunately, the Brown decision has been translated by some 
into a justification for maintaining the present public system. 
Racial integration is easier to administer, so the argument 
goes, in a centralized system in which all schools are alike. The 
right proportion of each racial group can simply be bussed to 
every school. 
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There are several reasons to question this view. There is 
first the issue of whether integration will be judicially required 
in all public school systems to the same extent that it has been 
in the South and isolated northern cities. If it is not, allowing 
parents to choose voluntarily among different types of schools 
may be the most important step toward more integration in 
schools. Certainly if a community or nation wants to integrate, 
a diversified school system need not be a hurdle. Schools could 
be required to meet a particular level of racial balance as a 
condition of receiving public funds. 
Moveover, the 'judiciary has made it clear that publicly 
funded schools must desegregate.28 Providing funds to new 
and existing alternative schools could increase the overall level 
of racial integration in schools29 and provide better education- 
al opportunities for more minority students. 
Indeed, the constitutional line against racial discrimination 
in education is so firm that the judiciary recently withdrew the 
tax-exempt status of private schools which discriminate in ad- 
missions.30 The Court dismissed arguments that such action 
would conflict with contitutionally protected rights of associ- 
ation: "There is a compelling as well as a reasonable govern- 
ment interest in the interdiction of racial discrimination which 
stands on highest constitutional ground."31 The Court refused 
to rely on statements by the Internal Revenue Service that it 
would enforce such a policy voluntarily. It also made clear that 
its ruling applies to any private school practicing racial dis- 
crimination and not just to the specific Mississippi schools 
mentioned in the case. 
Three months later a Wisconsin federal district court follow- 
ed suit and barred preferential state tax treatment, not just to 
schools but to any charitable organizations which discriminate 
in membership on the basis of race.32 
Both these cases are important, not only for the firm stand 
they take with respect to racial discrimination but because they 
ease the way to a time when government focuses more on the 
relations between individuals and private organizations and 
less on operating services directly. 
Thus, more diversity in schooling is possible without threat- 
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ening equality of access. Increasing diversity may even be a 
better strategy for improving educational opportunities than 
simply fighting about equal access to the present public 
schools. Coleman has demonstrated that current public schools 
do little if anything to help poor or black children to learn as 
much as their middle-class white counterparts?3 More 
recently, Christopher Jenks has argued that even if school 
achievements were equalized, there is little reason to believe 
income or status inequalities would be offset by present public 
schools.34 These gloomy conclusions do not bar the possibility 
that different schools might make a significant difference, at 
least in noncognitive skills, even if reading and math scores 
change little. 
Resolution of the problem of preventing racial dis- 
crimination leaves yet another major obstacle for alternative 
school supporters. The fight for more diversity, or, as some 
have phrased it, for family choice in education,35 is after all 
not a fight between families and some abstract entity. Rather it 
is a fight between a few families and the majority of their 
community. Sometimes it is a racial minority or an income 
minority; often, though, it is a minority by virtue of taste. 
Many poor families approve of their present public school for, 
rightly or wrongly, they consider it the best way to get their 
children into the mainstream of American economic life, while 
there are middle-income families who seek alternative schools 
which can provide less competition or regimentation. Tradi- 
tional notions of who are minorities do not always hold. 
The tension between minority tastes and the majority some- 
times manifests itself as a plea for following "professional 
judgment." Many parents contend that some other parents 
would not make use of the opportunity to choose schools even 
if it were available, and therefore poor children would be 
worse off than under the present system of geographic assign- 
ment by the state. A slight variation of this position is the 
statement that professional educators know more than parents 
about what is a good education. This is a view some profes- 
sionals no doubt encourage to strengthen the need for their 
services. 
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Yet even if professionals could agree on what constitutes a 
good school or education, professionals do not assess each 
child: the process would be too unwieldy to administrate. In- 
stead, the state matches students and schools for the most part 
on the basis of residence. 
Concern for the impact of choice on uninformed parents is 
well founded, but the concern might better be directed to 
providing parents with sufficient information to make wise 
choices. The strength of the resistance even to this effort is 
hard to explain. Possibly some of the resistance to allowing 
parents to make educational choices-even narrow ones limit- 
ed to state-approved alternatives- reflects a sex bias. Women, 
at least traditionally, as closest to Johnny's experience in 
school. Family choice in education would be primarily the 
woman's choice. While it is true that most elementary and 
many secondary school teachers are women, educational ad- 
ministrators, boards of education, and state legislators are 
overwhelmingly men. To the extent that legislative and board 
policies and admissions decisions constrain the influence of a 
given teacher, favoring professional choice over family choice 
in education is likely to maintain the power of male over 
female in making educational choices for children. 
Alternative schools may be a reform favored only by minor- 
ity interests. Legislatures, therefore, are likely never to support 
alternative schools. As with legislative reapportionment, the 
counter-majoritarian power of the courts may be needed. 
Prospects for Judicial Support 
Prospects for support of alternative schools are not neces- 
sarily any better in the courts. All of the arguments against 
forays into a political thicket which were raised against reap- 
portionment are likely to be used again. The Nixon Court is 
not likely to rush into such activism. There is, however, some 
precedent that can be mustered in favor of judicial protection 
of minority interests in education. 
Initially most courts did little to counter the common school 
movement. They upheld legislation to levy taxes to pay for 
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schooling36 and confirmed the right of states to prosecute 
parents who did not send their children to school.37 Even then, 
some state courts did protect the right of parents to pick and 
choose among the curriculum offerings of the schools they 
were being forced to use.38 
The public school movement proceeded successfully without 
judicial intervention until the early twenties. Then in several 
landmark cases the Supreme Court stepped in to offer some 
protection to minority interests in education. 
In Meyer v. Nebraska the Court held unconstitutional a stat- 
ute which prohibited teaching modern foreign languages to 
any student who had not yet passed the eighth grade. The 
Court observed that three rights were at issue: "the occupation 
rights of modern language teachers," "the opportunities of 
pupils to acquire knowledge," and "the power of parents to 
control the education of their own children.""39 But the case 
before the Court really raised only the first issue, because it 
involved an appeal of the conviction of a young teacher who 
had taught German to students in a Lutheran elementary 
school.40 The precedential value of the decision is, therefore, 
somewhat weak, although replete with verbal kudos for minor- 
ity tastes in education. 
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,41 the Court overturned an Ore- 
gon statute (inspired by the Klu Klux Klan) which would have 
required all students to attend public schools. Although the 
plaintiffs this time were private schools, the Court again raised 
the rights of parents and children in its opinion which contains 
the modern nonpublic schools' Magna Charta: "The funda- 
mental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this 
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only."42 
When Pierce was decided, no one focused much on the fact 
that the "right" there established was a hollow victory for any- 
one unable to afford private schooling. But since Pierce, certain 
rights have been singled out by the Court as so fundamental 
that they must be made equally available to the poor and the 
rich. These include certain criminal procedure rights,43 voting 
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rights,44 and the right to travel.45 Many have argued that 
educational rights are certainly as fundamental as these 
others-since the significance of the franchise, for example, 
may depend as much, if not more, on education as on proce- 
dural niceties. 
In the past few months an increasing number of courts have 
accepted the proposition that education is such a fundamental 
right.46 It is, therefore, now possible that for the first time 
courts will be willing to combine the Pierce doctrine with this 
expanded concern for protecting the educational rights of the 
poor in a fashion that provides judicial support for alternative 
schools. The judiciary might, for example, be moved to em- 
power the poor to have their share of public education re- 
sources devoted to schools of their choice in a quasi voucher 
program.47 
The hypothetical suit outlined above highlights some of the 
difficulties of using the equal protection clause to protect the 
rights of the poor. The judiciary might simply order private 
schools to admit students without regard to family income, just 
as they are now moving to require private schools to admit 
students without regard to race.48 But the result would be to 
bankrupt most of the private schools. In other words, protect- 
ing the rights of the poor, in education as elsewhere, requires 
state financial support as well as criminal sanctions if it is to 
work. But ordering legislatures to appropriate money poten- 
tially infringes on the traditional separation of powers so much 
that the judiciary has understandably been willing to do so 
only in limited areas. 
There may be more justification for the courts to order 
legislatures to appropriate funds for education than in some of 
the other areas where action has already been taken. Ordering 
the states to provide lawyers to poor criminal defendants, for 
example, entailed a new expense. An order requiring the 
funding of qualified alternative schools, by contrast, would 
involve simply a reallocation of funds which must otherwise be 
spent for the same students in the public system. Reallocation 
is not such a big step as ordering new expenditures outright, 
particularly in view of the recently demonstrated judicial will- 
188 School Review 
This content downloaded from 141.161.244.115 on Tue, 01 Dec 2015 18:43:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Judith C. Areen 
ingness to reallocate public education funds among public 
schools within school districts,49 and among public districts 
themselves.50 
The courts might be reluctant however to provide control of 
funds to individual families without any restrictions on how 
they are used. Families might simply keep the money and 
pretend to educate the children at home, or spend it in in- 
stitutions which taught little. A more acceptable request in the 
eyes of the judiciary, therefore, might be a joint request for 
funding from parents and from the specific alternative school 
of their choice. The school would have to demonstrate that it 
met all state and local certification requirements before it 
could become eligible for funding. An advantage of this ap- 
proach is that it would create some private regulation. Several 
families would have to agree on the worth of a school before a 
funding request could be made. The process would guard 
against the unacceptable idiosyncracies of an isolated family 
where the parents did not really have the best interests of their 
children at heart. 
Countless hurdles to such a suit come immediately to mind. 
Just how would a school prove it was "public" enough to be 
entitled to public funding? Proof that religion was not taught 
would probably be essential.51 A policy of nondiscriminatory 
admissions would need to be shown. Compliance with state 
and local education standards would have to be demonstra- 
ted.52 Placing t.he total burden on the school might make 
successful proof impossible. Ideally, it should be sufficient to 
show prima facie compliance with existing standards. The 
burden would then be on the state to show why the school 
desired by this group of parents was not an acceptable 
recipient of public funds.53 
The one recent case to challenge the right of the state to 
compel attendance at state-approved schools does not offer 
much encouragement to alternative school enthusiasts. In Wis- 
consin v. Yoder54 the Supreme Court was asked to approve a 
state court decision exempting Amish students from school 
after the eighth grade. The Court upheld the decision, but it 
seemed more moved by the fact that the Amish are "very 
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law-abiding members of society [who] reject public welfare in 
any of its usual modern forms"55 than by any concern for 
educational diversity. As Chief Justice Burger observed, "[It] 
cannot be over-emphasized that we are not dealing with a way 
of life and a mode of education by a group claiming to have 
recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened 
process for rearing children for modern life.'56 
Since neither legislative nor judicial support for funding 
alternative schools is likely in the immediate future, the best 
hope for alternative school supporters appears to be negotiat- 
ing with school boards either to give some public schools 
enough autonomy to remodel themselves, or to allow a few 
private alternative schools in the public system whether by fiat 
or contract. Subcontracts were let to private interests in specific 
subjects during the abortive performance contracting ex- 
periments sponsored by the OEO. It may similarly be possible 
to contract out an entire school. The danger with such in- 
cremental change, as usual, is that it may be co-opted by the 
process to the point that it is no change at all. 
Plato wanted guardians to rear children. We have learned 
that some parents are not fit for the job, but having the state 
rear all children hardly seems a better alternative. Our country 
needs an intermediate institution that is more personalized 
than a state system, yet more egalitarian than the old family 
centered system which failed to protect some children from 
their parents' negligence. Schools can perhaps be that in- 
termediate "community," but only if individual families can 
share with the state the responsibility of shaping them. 
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